The Psychology of Crowds and Religious Movements
According to Le Bon, the first conspicuous feature of the collective mind is a temporary eclipse of certain dimensions of the individual personality. By entering the crowd a person forfeits part of his individuality and of his sense of personal responsibility. Because his deeds are lost among the actions of thousands of others, his awareness of accountability can diminish, and he may commit acts from which, in isolation, he would normally refrain. For Le Bon, this explains why, at times, educated, refined and cautious individuals, once absorbed into a crowd, display conduct that does not accord with their usual character.
Le Bon then analyses the emotional constitution of the crowd. In his view the crowd acts chiefly under the sway of emotion rather than under the guidance of logical reasoning. When alone, a person can compare different arguments and revise his decisions, but within the collective atmosphere the intensity of feeling restricts that capacity. Thus moderation may be replaced by extremism: love may swell into extraordinary devotion, hatred into intense enmity, hope into unrealistic expectations, and fear into shared panic.
This observation helps us to comprehend certain manifestations in the religious history of the sub-continent. The exceptional veneration surrounding leading figures, the fiercely emotional colouring that sectarian loyalties can sometimes assume, and the harshly negative images fostered regarding rival groups are phenomena that cannot be understood solely through scholarly disagreements; underlying them is the element of emotional attachment and collective identity.
Le Bon regards “psychological contagion” (nafsīyātī sarāyat) as a principal cause of this emotional intensity. Emotions and ideas, he argues, spread through a crowd in the same manner that infectious diseases pass among individuals. If a few people exhibit zeal, fear or anger, that state can swiftly permeate the entire assembly. In this process people do not accept an idea through conscious reasoning; rather, they are unconsciously influenced by the collective environment.
Within this perspective one may view the importance of rallies, mass gatherings, orations, religious slogans, collective adhkār and shared devotional experiences in the religious movements of the sub-continent. These activities are not merely channels for the transmission of information; they also play a crucial role in forming collective emotions and a common sensibility.
In this context Le Bon assigns fundamental significance to the notion of “suggestibility” (alqāʾ-pazīrī). In his estimation a crowd is, to some extent, comparable to a person under tanwīm-i nafsī (hypnosis). For that reason, intricate scholarly arguments and philosophical refinements seldom prove effective in influencing public assemblies, whereas simple slogans, powerful symbols and repeatedly invoked notions exert far greater impact.
Thus an important aspect of the religious movements of the sub-continent becomes evident. At the popular level a movement’s success often hinges not upon the complexity or strength of its scholarly proofs, but upon its capacity to cast its message in a simple, emotive and symbolic mould. Hence concise slogans, distinctive rituals, renowned personalities and historical references leave a deep imprint upon popular consciousness, while detailed academic discussions usually remain confined to limited circles.
Accordingly Le Bon places special emphasis on the potency of symbols and of the collective imagination. The public mind thinks not in abstract concepts but in symbolic and pictorial forms. Philosophical reasoning and logical analysis do not produce the same effect as a telling symbol, an historical narrative or a resonant slogan. A national flag, religious observances, legendary accounts and revolutionary emblems hold extraordinary importance in collective life precisely because they activate the public imagination and awaken shared emotions.
In the religious movements of the sub-continent, the personalities of the akābir, the madrasahs, khānqāhs, historical events, sectarian dress and appearance, specialised terminologies and sectarian emblems all possess this symbolic force. Their significance lies not merely in their outward existence but in the meanings that followers attach to them.
In Le Bon’s estimation leadership, too, is intimately tied to crowd psychology. Because the collective mind is moved more by conviction and passion than by critical thought, it inclines towards a leader who manifests unshakeable confidence in his vision and presents his message in a simple yet compelling manner.
This reality is also plainly visible in the religious history of the sub-continent. The influence of public figures resides not only in their scholarly attainment but also in the certainty, moral authority and spiritual or social prestige they display before their followers.
Le Bon extends his discussion to the study of civilisations and collective beliefs. Human societies, he argues, are not founded solely upon rational principles; rather, they rest upon shared beliefs, historical memories, traditions and collective representations. Religions, national traditions and civilisational myths provide people with a common consciousness and preserve social cohesion.
This point is especially relevant to the study of the religious tradition of the sub-continent, where religious identity is not merely a set of doctrines but also a repository of historical memory, cultural tradition and collective experience. Accordingly, purely logical critique or scholarly objection often fails to diminish the social influence of those movements that furnish their adherents with a strong spiritual and historical identity.
After its publication Le Bon’s work exerted a profound influence upon politics, sociology, collective psychology and media studies. Modern social psychology, however, has raised fundamental objections to many of his claims. Contemporary approaches, particularly Social Identity Theory, contend that individuals do not, upon entering a crowd, become entirely bereft of reason or individuality; rather, they act in an organised manner under a definite collective identity.
Hence it appears more fruitful to read Le Bon and modern theories in a complementary rather than a confrontational fashion. Le Bon enables us to understand the power of emotions, symbols and the collective imagination, while modern theories clarify that collective behaviour is not always irrational but can also be organised under shared identities and values.
Such a balanced perspective seems most appropriate for the study of the religious movements of the sub-continent. Explaining their success solely through crowd psychology or popular emotionalism would certainly be inadequate, for behind them operate scholarly tradition, religious heritage, social structures, political circumstances and historical experience. Yet it is equally impossible to ignore the roles of collective identity, religious symbols, emotional attachments, leadership influence and the delineation of intellectual boundaries.
Accordingly, it is preferable to regard Le Bon’s thought not as a definitive explanation of the religious movements of the sub-continent but as an interpretive lens. Its chief value lies in the reminder that the power of popular movements resides not only in their doctrinal or scholarly content, but also in their capacity to organise and mobilise the collective imagination, symbols, emotions, historical memories and group affiliations. In this aspect collective psychology becomes indispensable for the study of every major popular movement, including religious ones. The enduring significance of The Crowd therefore consists less in the answers it supplies than in the questions it poses concerning human collective behaviour, mass politics and religious movements.
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