Flawed Logic in Social Arguments

Community and SocietyEducation
Flawed Logic in Social Arguments

Common opinion holds that if both premises of an argument are correct, the conclusion drawn from them must likewise be correct. In the terminology of logic this is expressed by saying: when the ṣughrāʾ is sound and the kubrāʾ is also sound, the outcome of the inference ought to be sound. Yet a strange tragedy attends the logic that prevails in our society: here the ṣughrāʾ is indeed valid, the kubrāʾ is indeed valid, but what is delivered from the womb of these two is of such a nature that intellect can do nothing but beat its head. It is as though all the digits in an arithmetic sum are right, the addition and subtraction impeccably performed, yet someone, by sheer whim, writes an elephant as the answer.

Amongst us there are certain individuals who trust their own persons more than proof. In their reckoning the function of evidence is merely to furnish a few sentences in favour of an opinion already fixed. The intended conclusion is predetermined; the minor and major premises are sought afterwards. It is as if the building were first erected and only thereafter the ground dug for its foundations.

I once met a gentleman who said: “Our elders were exceedingly God-fearing and scrupulous.” I replied: “Without doubt.” He continued: “And the God-fearing are beloved to God.” I affirmed: “That too is correct.” Then, with an air as though pronouncing the final verdict of the Supreme Court, he declared: “Therefore I also am beloved to God; nothing lies between me and entry into Paradise save death itself, and all who bear enmity towards me are in truth enemies of God!” I kept looking at his face. He took my silence as acknowledgement of the grandeur of his argument, imagining, perhaps, that I was so overawed by his magnificent edifice of logic that I dared not enter it. In reality I was merely pondering that the piety of elders is a proof of their own piety, not a guarantee of my salvation. If by a saint’s righteousness every person who mentions his name automatically became righteous, the world would never know scarcity of taqwā. Virtue would have turned into inherited property, transferred simply by displaying papers of affiliation. Some hold that the blessing of a righteous man’s goodness reaches his descendants, disciples and devotees, yet they fail to tell us whether, together with that blessing, the account of his own misdeeds is likewise transferred!

I met a certain Nadwī gentleman whose writing contained an error in Arabic. I drew his attention to it, most respectfully, whereupon he became vexed. “Do you know,” he said, “that I studied at Nadwat al-ʿUlamāʾ? The Arabic standard of Nadwa is very high.” Who could deny that? “Therefore,” he concluded, “my Arabic is authoritative.” I responded: “Sir, the standing of Nadwa is unquestioned, but that does not transform every sentence you utter into an imperial decree of the Arabic language.” At this his countenance displayed the same expression that appears on a minister’s face when informed that his signed order is contrary to law. His argument could be summarised thus: Nadwa is a distinguished scholarly institution; I was its student; therefore my Arabic cannot be wrong. If one extends this logic, a graduate of a medical college who prescribes the wrong medicine will render the medicine correct merely because he studied medicine; and should a bridge constructed by an engineer collapse, the fault would lie with the river, not the engineer, for he possesses an engineering degree. Amongst us, at times, a certificate ceases to be evidence of knowledge and becomes instead a licence for being free of the need to learn.
This very logic was displayed by the Jews. They would say: we are the progeny of Ḥaḍrat Ibrāhīm ʿalayhi al-salām, and Ḥaḍrat Ibrāhīm ʿalayhi al-salām was beloved to God; therefore we too are beloved to God. It is as though a father’s sanctity is a certificate automatically issued to his children at birth, no matter what contrary exploits they achieve in their own lives.

The Quraysh were likewise adherents of such reasoning. They said: Ḥaḍrat Ibrāhīm ʿalayhi al-salām established ḥajj; we too perform ḥajj, we provide water for the pilgrims; therefore we are upon the religion of Ibrāhīm. That is, the lineage is present, the administration of ḥajj is present, the service of the pilgrims is present; there remains no need to act upon the real spirit of the teachings of Ḥaḍrat Ibrāhīm ʿalayhi al-salām. Wā asafāh! Yā ḥuznāh! By applying a coat of paint to a building a man does not become its architect, and by knowing the address of a saint’s house the walāyah of that saint is not inherited.

A gentleman arrived from Egypt. With great confidence he remarked: “Whoever drinks from the River Nile becomes an eloquent speaker.” I asked: “Have you drunk from it yourself?” “Indeed,” he answered, “therefore I too am eloquent.” I said: “Sir, then the donkeys dwelling on the banks of the Nile ought also to enter the arena of oratory.” He became angry, even though I was merely endorsing his claim, only taking its necessary implication a little further. Among us, the claim of having partaken of some benefit is much the same. One says he has studied under a certain teacher; another that he has spent time in the company of a certain shaykh; yet another that he has sifted the dust of a certain land. But when his knowledge is tested, it emerges that dust he did sift, yet no pearl did he obtain.

An American scholar resided in Oxford, professing authority on Central Asia. His assertions concerning Bukhārā and Samarqand were so categorical one felt even the lanes of those cities had been constructed in his dreams. A Central Asian scholar pointed out an historical error of his. The American became incensed: “I am an American; I studied at an American university. The standard of American universities is a hundred thousand times higher than that of Third World universities. Therefore I know the streets of Bukhārā and Samarqand better than the inhabitants themselves.” I reflected: if this principle be accepted, then an American expert should know Lahore’s Anārkalī, Delhi’s Jāmiʿ Masjid and Peshawar’s Qaṣṣah Khwānī Bāzār better than the local residents, provided he has written a dissertation upon them. Geography would thereby become a kind of degree that requires no foot to touch the earth; university admission would suffice. And if any inhabitant dared offer a word about his own city, he would first need to present proof of his citizenship and academic credentials!

A gentleman declared: “I have studied politics for twenty years; therefore my opinion on political matters should be regarded as definitive.” I asked: “Have you taken part in practical politics as well?” “No,” he replied, “but I have read all the important books on politics.” I said: “Then you must know that by reading books on swimming a man cannot cross a river.” He retorted: “You do not understand my scholarly competence.” I replied: “Sir, that is precisely my misfortune: no textbook has yet been published to help me comprehend it.”

Another gentleman took pride in his family tree: “Our grandfather was a great scholar, my father too was a man of learning, my uncle likewise a pious man; therefore we, in knowledge and character, are second to none.” I responded: “Your family must also have possessed a horse that ran exceedingly fast; can you now run at the same speed?” He fell silent for a while. Perhaps for the first time he sensed that one may inherit a house, land, and sometimes debts, yet knowledge, piety and intellect are not transferred by registry.
One gentleman narrated an historical incident incorrectly in his writing. I provided a source and corrected him. He said: “I am the author of fifty books!” I replied: “That is most pleasing, but by writing fifty books a mistake does not become correct fifty times over.” He demanded: “How many books have you written?” I said: “Not so many that I might render an error true by the force of my fame.” Among us there prevails a curious principle: the person who has written many books—his mistake too becomes scholarly research, whereas one who has written few—his correct statement is counted mere opinion. Truth, it seems, relates not to evidence but to the number of volumes and the thickness of their bindings. In the view of some, being the author of a book guarantees that whatever is written therein must be correct. According to this principle every published error in the world would have to be accepted as truth merely because someone expended paper and ink to print it.

A gentleman, speaking of his command of English, said: “I was educated in London; therefore no one can object to my English.” I responded: “Yet in the sentence you just uttered there are three grammatical mistakes.” He said: “That is the British accent; you would not understand.” I thought: excellent! If error be re-labelled accent, the dictionary itself would be rendered unemployed. No one would henceforth speak incorrectly; every error would constitute a new accent.

A businessman stated: “I have earned ten million rupees; therefore I am a very intelligent man.” I replied: “It is also possible you earned ten million because others were more intelligent than you and granted you the opportunity to do so.” He was greatly displeased. In his view wealth is the seal of intellect that authenticates every word and deed of the possessor. Yet at market sometimes one pair of shoes costs more than another, though that does not mean it walks farther.

A religious gentleman said: “I perform the five daily prayers, therefore every opinion of mine is correct.” I replied: “Ṣalāh teaches a person humility; who informed you that it also renders him infallible?” He said: “You do not realise how devout I am.” I thought: if worship, rather than producing humility, engenders a sense of superiority, perhaps somewhere along the way the ego too has made wuḍūʾ and joined the prayer line. Another gentleman remarked concerning his opponent: “He opposes me; I am upon truth; therefore he is upon falsehood.” I asked: “If two men oppose each other, do both thereby become falsehood, or may one of them remain upon truth?” He said: “Do not spin philosophy.” I replied: “Sir, philosophy was spun by you; I merely smelt its fragrance.”

In our society there is a faction that regards every disagreement as ignorance and every criticism as enmity. To them, whoever praises them is insightful, and whoever exposes their error is ill-intentioned. Truth becomes a mirror: if one’s own face appears pleasing in it, the mirror is authentic; if it shows a blemish, the mirror itself is defective.
Among us there is a style of argumentation in which the premises are taken from reality, yet the conclusion is carved according to desire. The ṣughrāʾ and kubrāʾ stand each correct in its place, but the logical bridge erected between them—no one has seen its design. The traveller proclaims arrival at the destination beforehand, builds the bridge afterwards, and if he plunges into the river before the bridge is completed, he deems it a test of his own truthfulness. Yet in logic it is not sufficient that the premises alone be correct; it is also necessary that the ruling deduced from them follow from them necessarily. If the premises be correct yet the conclusion drawn is not their necessary entailment, then no matter how splendid the argument appears, it is defective. Through the righteousness of a saint we ourselves do not become righteous; through the grandeur of an institution every statement of ours does not become correct; through the nobility of a family nobility does not automatically arise in our own character; through the progress of a nation every opinion of its citizens does not become sound; and through the fame of a scholar every line he writes does not acquire the status of revelation.

Share WhatsApp Telegram

Leave a comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *