Definition
In logic, there are two major types of knowledge: concept (taṣawwur) and judgment (taṣdīq). Both can be intuitive or reasoned, but logic primarily concerns itself with the reasoned forms of both. Henceforth, when we mention taṣawwur and taṣdīq, we are referring specifically to these reasoned forms.
Logicians assert that a concept is only attained through a definition (taʿrīf), also referred to as a muʿarrif. A definition is a statement which, once comprehended, grants a mental grasp of the thing being defined. This is a core discussion in logic: that for the true meaning of any material or abstract thing to become clear, it must be properly bounded – that is, its limits must be described in a way that reveals its reality or, more precisely, distinguishes it from other things. This explanatory statement is also called qawl shāriḥ. A valid definition must be inclusive (jāmiʿ) and exclusive (māniʿ). Some scholars refer to this as muṭṭarid and munʿakis. For further elaboration, refer to my book Mabādiʾ al-Manṭiq.
The act of defining is immensely useful in all sciences and arts. To create a logical definition, knowledge of genus (jins) and species (nawʿ) is fundamental. To distinguish one member of a genus or species from another, one must describe its essential attributes (awṣāf ḥaqīqiyya) or distinctive qualities (awṣāf mumayyiza), so that its concept becomes crystal clear in the mind. The essential attributes are termed faṣl, while the distinctive ones are called khāṣṣa. For instance:
A masjid is a building constructed specifically for the worship of the True God – here, ‘building’ is the genus, and the rest of the description functions as the faṣl.
A verb is a word that is self-sufficient in conveying meaning and implies a particular tense – here, ‘word’ is the genus, and the rest is the faṣl.
A farḍ is a ruling that is obligatory and established by a specific type of evidence – in this, ‘ruling’ is the genus, and the subsequent parts form the faṣl.
The four types of definition (ḥadd tāmm, ḥadd nāqiṣ, rasm tāmm, and rasm nāqiṣ) are explained in my aforementioned book.
The topic of definitions in logic has been subjected to numerous criticisms – this is not the place to delve into all of them. The concept of definition is not new to the scholarly world; every civilisation and culture has used it, and continues to use it, because it facilitates distinction and understanding. However, logic has made this subject unnecessarily convoluted with baseless claims, entangling both logicians and others alike.
We shall soon encounter the claim that judgment-based knowledge is only derived through proof (dalīl). The logicians’ assertion – that a concept can only be attained through their artificial definitions – is itself a judgment. What then is the proof for this judgment? To this day, logicians have failed to provide one.
One of their gravest errors is the claim that the essential reality of something can be known through its definition. No civilisation has ever made such a claim, nor has it ever been the practice in any science.
The most absurd part of their system is this: they say that if a definition contains both the nearest genus (jins qarīb) and the specific differentia (faṣl), it is a complete definition (ḥadd tāmm). And since faṣl indicates the reality of something, the question arises – how did you come to know the reality of that thing you label as faṣl?
Take the example of the human being, arguably the most well-known entity. Logicians define him as a rational animal (ḥayawān nāṭiq). But saying that rationality defines the essence of a human being is entirely baseless. Do you know all living beings? Do you even know the reality of life itself? Are angels not alive? Are they not rational? If they are rational, then how can rational be considered a distinctive quality (faṣl) of humans? Certain Qur’anic verses suggest that there are articulate beings in the heavens beyond just angels.
Imam al-Ghazālī and others, to escape this problem, added the word māyit (mortal) to the definition of a human. But even then, the issue remains unresolved – and this is not the place to go into further detail.
Due to the irrational condition that a ḥadd tāmm must include the faṣl, logicians have never been able to formulate a definition free from objection.
If the claim is that knowledge of a concept is only gained through definition, and it is clear that no concept has ever truly been defined, then it is also clear that logicians have never really known anything. In other words, the result of logic is ignorance.
Logicians say that no concept can be known without a definition. But the question is: when did the person who made the definition come to know the concept? If after defining it, then why did he define it in the first place? And if before defining it, then your claim that concepts are only knowable through definitions is invalid.
Also, bear in mind that definitions are merely combinations of words. How can one acquire knowledge of realities through mere words? The taste of something is known by tasting it; what is visible is known by seeing; what is audible is known by hearing; and what is comprehensible is known by understanding. Words do not reveal the reality of taste, sight, sound, or comprehension.
There are many other objections to the theory of definitions – Muslim scholars have consistently raised them. Most of these discussions are summarised by Ibn Taymiyyah in his book al-Radd ʿala al-Manṭiqiyyīn – it is a must-read for every serious student of knowledge.
This article was translated by AI. For the original, visit:
https://t.me/DrAkramNadwi/6112
