Civilization Corrupting Minds and Morals
It is not necessary that every form of progress be an ascent, nor that every civilisation, whatever strength and impregnability it may have attained, be worthy of admiration and esteem. Man may advance in his domination of nature, uncover secrets that never crossed his imagination, raise edifices that dazzle the sight, and invent instruments that shorten distances and bring the furthest horizons near—yet remain, despite all that, far removed from genuine human elevation. For civilisation is not merely what man adds to the world by way of tools and machines; rather, before and after that, it is what he adds to his own self in sound reason, noble character and penetrating insight. Material progress indicates the extent of what a human can do; moral progress indicates the extent of what he ought to do and ought to refrain from doing. Between the two lies a vast gulf which one nation may cross while another, whatever power and knowledge it possesses, may fail to traverse.
Modern Western civilisation has inflicted upon humanity harms beyond conjecture. The greatest of these are not the disturbances it has engendered in the balances of society, politics and economics; rather, the greatest and most perilous is that, in many of its intellectual and material manifestations, it has contributed to corrupting both the intellect and morals. The corruption of the intellect is the root of much misconduct, and morals cannot stand aright if the scale by which actions are weighed is disturbed and the point of reference to which judgement is referred is lost.
The intellect is a supreme blessing: by it the human being distinguishes truth from falsehood, good from evil, and beauty from ugliness; by it he rises above blind submission to appetites and impulses, becoming capable of considering the consequences of his deeds, weighing his interests against those of others, and discriminating between what he desires and what he ought to desire. Intellect, in its reality, is not a mere capacity for thinking and inference; a person may be exceedingly intelligent, resourceful and widely learned, yet be devoid of sound intellect if he makes his intelligence a servant of his appetites, his knowledge a means to his greed, and his reasoning a path to justify what cannot be justified. The intellect is sound only when it stands independent of the domination of caprice, accords with the wholesome fiṭrah, and makes truth—not desire or interest—the criterion of judgement.
One would have expected that the civilisation which has reached such lofty heights in the fields of science and knowledge would grant the intellect greater freedom and acuity, aiding it to perceive realities in their human and moral dimensions. What in fact happened, in most of its major currents, was the opposite: the scales were overturned. Instead of submitting to truths and principles, man began to reshape them according to his cravings and priorities. The question that occupies the mind is no longer: “Is this true or false?” nor “Is this good or evil?” Rather it has become: “Is this useful or not? Does it fulfil a desire of mine or stand in its way?” Thus the intellect moved from the rank of judge over the passions to the rank of advocate for them, from the task of distinguishing and rectifying desires to the task of seeking arguments that confer legitimacy upon them.
This change is no trivial matter, for it transfers man from submitting to a standard that transcends his self to submitting solely to his self; from acknowledging the existence of moral truths to which he must bow to believing that things acquire their value from his own choice. Hence arose an extreme and overbearing individualism that in some of its conceptions made “freedom” synonymous with liberation from every restraint, not with liberation from ignorance, servitude and passion. The difference between the two senses is vast: freedom that is not governed by reason nor refined by morals may turn into another kind of enslavement, for man becomes captive to his desires while imagining himself master of himself, and his will becomes subservient to whatever lust overwhelms him while supposing he has escaped all domination.
Perhaps the clearest face of this disorder is that material life, within the modern Western conception of civilisation, has seized a place that almost renders it the ultimate goal of human existence. Success is measured by wealth and influence; progress by the capacity to produce and consume; happiness by what one can acquire and enjoy. The great questions touching the meaning and purpose of life, responsibility and duty, and the truth that should be preferred even when it conflicts with interest, have in many milieus retreated before the clamour of matter and the din of utility. It is as though man has forgotten that he does not live merely to eat, possess and consume, but also to think, be guided, act justly and show mercy; that the needs of the body, however great, neither exhaust human reality nor encompass its dignity.
The effects of this inversion have appeared plainly in economic and social life. The consumerist tendency, for example, is no longer satisfied with providing man’s needs; it works to manufacture his needs, shape his desires and convince him that he will not attain happiness unless he possesses what he formerly lacked and will win no esteem unless he displays his wealth and goods. Under such logic, man comes closer to being a consumer than a human being; his worth is measured by what he purchases, his standing by what he owns, and his success by what he can parade before others. How far is this image from true human elevation! A civilisation that promises to satisfy desires yet then labours to multiply them endlessly resembles one who gives seawater to the thirsty: the more he drinks, the more intense his thirst becomes.
If the corruption of the intellect leads to the corruption of the standard, the corruption of the standard soon manifests in morals. Morals are not founded upon mutable desires; they rest upon principles that must remain constant, whether they coincide with interests or clash with them. Justice is not just because we profit from it; oppression is not foul merely because we fear its consequences. Justice possesses intrinsic worth, and oppression intrinsic ugliness. When this truth disappears from the human conscience, nothing remains between good and evil except what utility dictates; man no longer rejects aggression because it is aggression, but because it may expose him to loss; he no longer denounces injustice because it contradicts truth, but because it might befall him or those whose affairs concern him.
Modern European history offers a striking testimony to this paradox. Certain European states reached extraordinary levels of scientific, philosophical and political organisation, yet at the same time practised colonialism, slavery, the plundering of peoples’ wealth and their subjugation by force. These practices were not merely occasional personal deviations; behind them, in many cases, stood economic and political interests and racist theories seeking to cloak domination with a veneer of civilisational or natural superiority. Here the paradox reveals itself in its most hideous form: an intellect capable of uncovering the laws of nature and inventing means of production and war, yet incapable of grasping that no human being—whatever his colour, language or homeland—may legitimately be made an instrument in another’s hand, owned by whomever holds power and dominance.
The gravest aspect of this experience is not that the strong oppressed the weak—humanity has known that in many ages—but that oppression at times succeeded in finding for itself a philosophy that justifies it, a science that adorns it, a law that organises it and a moral rhetoric that veils it. When knowledge is harnessed to tighten control over peoples and theories are used to classify human beings into varying degrees of dignity and entitlement, the flaw lies not merely in conduct but has reached the roots of thought and its method. Not every productive intellect is a sound intellect; not every piece of knowledge beneficial in the hand of its possessor is beneficial for humanity. Indeed, the intellect may become yet more perilous when it excels in devising means that serve corrupt ends.
This contradiction was not confined to the colonial experience; it has also appeared in contemporary international relations. Slogans of freedom, justice and human rights are raised, yet responses to human-rights violations vary greatly according to the scales of interest, alliances and influence. An aggression may be denounced in one place and tolerated in another; institutions, media and public opinion may be mobilised to support victims in one country while the tragedies of victims elsewhere receive scant attention. The point is not that all Western states or societies adopt a single stance, nor that this double standard is exclusive to them; rather, it is that subordinating universal principles to political interest exposes a profound crisis in the very understanding of morality. Justice that changes with the identity of oppressor and oppressed is not absolute justice; it is an interest donning the language of justice as a veil.
One of the strangest paradoxes is that the civilisation which raised freedom as one of its loftiest banners has created, in some aspects of its social and economic life, new forms of hidden enslavement. The human being who was liberated from many restraints has become exposed to others: his manufactured needs bind him, the mechanisms of consumption drain his time, and the means of modern communication seize his attention. Digital platforms, in particular, have revealed the possibility of deploying technical knowledge to direct human behaviour and influence individual choices. When a platform’s success depends on keeping the user before the screen as long as possible, excitement, anger and polarisation may become tools to capture his attention—not because such content is truer or more beneficial, but because it is better able to stimulate his emotions. Thus a person imagines he is choosing freely while the informational environment surrounding him has been designed to steer his attention, feed certain inclinations and trigger specific desires.
All this indicates that the crisis is not one of knowledge or technical capability; it is a crisis of the goal to which knowledge is directed, of the reference that regulates the movement of the intellect, and of the conscience that sets limits to utility. The machine in itself bears neither virtue nor vice; its value is determined by the end to which man harnesses it. Technical advance does not guarantee moral advance, just as the abundance of information does not necessitate sound insight. Man may be able to fabricate what previous generations could not even imagine, yet that does not mean he has become more capable of recognising what he ought to do and what he must refrain from doing.
Justice requires that we do not confuse Western civilisation in the totality of its history and output with the materialistic and utilitarian tendencies that have emerged in some of its phases and currents. This civilisation has produced philosophers, thinkers and reformers who criticised tyranny and exploitation, defended human dignity and justice, and exposed the contradictions of their societies and institutions. The existence of such critical voices, however, does not absolve those trends that made utility the highest criterion, contributed to reducing man to his material dimension, and enabled the justification of injustice whenever it suited interests and passions. Genuine critique of civilisation does not consist in denying its virtues but in uncovering its contradictions and distinguishing between what elevates man within it and what debases him.
If we seek to trace these varied manifestations back to a single root, we find the common factor is the inversion of the relationship between truth and interest. In colonialism, human dignity was subordinated to the demands of power; in consumerism, human needs were subordinated to the logic of the market; in international politics, principles were subordinated to the balance of influence; in the digital world, human attention has become an economic resource over which institutions compete. These diverse images are but manifestations of one civilisational crisis whose essence is that the means have overwhelmed the ends, capability has outstripped wisdom, and utility has seized the place that ought to belong to truth.
A civilisation that corrupts both intellect and morals demolishes man from within, even if it erects towering structures of power and affluence around him. The intellect is the civilisation’s sight; morals are its spirit. If the sight is lost and the spirit squandered, nothing remains of civilisation but an enormous body in which machines move, noises rise and wealth accumulates, yet it is incapable of answering the simplest human questions: What is truth? What is good? What is it that renders a human life worthy of being lived?
The way out of this impasse is not to reject knowledge, deny the achievements of the age or withdraw from the world; that would not cure the ailment but flee from confronting it. The path is to restore to the intellect its genuine freedom, to accord fiṭrah its due esteem, and to reinstate to morals their authority; to make knowledge a means of serving man, not enslaving him; to make freedom a path to responsibility, not a pretext for licence; to regard utility as legitimate so long as it does not destroy justice nor violate rights. The grandeur of civilisation does not lie in enabling man to possess the world, but in rendering him worthy of cultivating it, fit to benefit from its bounties and capable of giving every thing its due measure: not selling truth for utility, not sacrificing humanity for power, and not exchanging the serenity of conscience for a fleeting pleasure of life.
Of what worth is it for a person to gain the whole world if he loses his own self? What benefit is there in reaching the pinnacle of domination over nature if he proves unable to dominate his passions? A civilisation that does not refine man may increase his power, but it does not necessarily increase his goodness; it may grant him the keys of the world, but not necessarily the keys of his own soul. That, in my estimation, is the greatest tragedy of a civilisation when it becomes separated from intellect and morals: man advances in everything—except in his humanity.