ʿIlm al-Kalām and the Proof of God

21/1/2026
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
The Qurʾān’s call to faith is not founded upon intricate philosophical premises or abstract rational syllogisms. Rather, it rests upon the fiṭrah salīmah—the sound, uncorrupted human nature—which the Creator Himself has implanted within the human being. This fiṭrah, by its very constitution, guides a person to the recognition that this universe has a Creator, a Governor, and a Sovereign. The testimonies of this innate awareness are evident both within the human being’s own existence and throughout the vast expanse of the cosmos surrounding him. For this reason, the Qurʾān repeatedly directs human attention to the āyāt al-anfus (the signs within the self) and the āyāt al-āfāq (the signs in the horizons), so that, without recourse to any external philosophical crutch, one may recognise the truth through personal observation, perception, and innate consciousness.
In other words, the Qurʾānic call is grounded in knowledge of those certain and self-evident realities which present themselves to sound reason with such clarity that no intellectually honest person can find any reasonable scope for denying them. This call does not demand that a person first submit to some abstract philosophical system; rather, it invites him directly to behold reality itself and to listen attentively to the voice of human nature.
In contrast, metaphysics-based philosophy does not proceed by direct inference from external, perceptible realities. Instead, it is largely constructed upon rational abstractions, hypothetical notions, and mental conjectures. Its discourse does not take as its starting point the observable order of the universe or the testimonies of human nature; rather, it begins with abstract concepts such as existence and non-existence, contingency and necessity—concepts that have no immediate or direct connection with common human consciousness or innate perception.
The proofs advanced in ʿilm al-kalām for the existence of God are, in reality, products of this very metaphysical philosophy. Although these arguments have been presented in Islamic terminology and couched in a religious idiom, their intellectual foundations are not drawn from the Qurʾān and the Sunnah. Rather, they are rooted in the same philosophical abstraction that entered the Islamic intellectual milieu through Greek thought.
In ʿilm al-kalām, two well-known arguments are generally put forward to establish the existence of God. They are mentioned here only in outline. In subsequent discussions, we shall demonstrate in detail how weak their foundations are from a rational standpoint, and how they fail to establish the reality of lordship and divinity upon which Muslim faith rests, and to which the Qurʾān and the Prophetic Sunnah call. Through these arguments, neither the true affirmation of the Divine Essence is achieved, nor is a correct understanding of His attributes attained. Indeed, even the affirmation of tawḥīd—the very foundation and core of Islam—cannot be realised through them.
Anyone who reflects upon these two arguments with impartiality and seriousness will clearly perceive that they neither lead to genuine knowledge of the Creator, nor clarify the proper relationship between servant and Lord, nor provide a foundation for a tawḥīd grounded in worship, obedience, and sincerity. For this reason, such discussions remain mere mental exercises, failing to establish any deep connection with living faith or vibrant certainty. A detailed examination of all these matters will follow in the forthcoming pages.
According to the mutakallimūn, the two celebrated proofs employed to establish existence are neither derived from the Qurʾān nor from the Prophetic Sunnah صلى الله عليه وسلم. Their true origins lie in the polytheistic and unbelieving Greek philosophy, later presented in Islamic dress.

No prophet ever made these arguments part of his call; no Companion adopted them; no trace of them is found among the Tābiʿūn; and none of the authoritative imams of the Ummah—such as Abū Ḥanīfah, Mālik ibn Anas, Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al‐Shāfiʿī, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl al‐Bukhārī, or Muslim ibn al‐Ḥajjāj (may God have mercy upon them all)—ever adopted these philosophical arguments as the foundation of faith or as a method of religious دعوت.
Rather, the path of all of them was one and the same: the call of the Qurʾān, the testimony of human nature, and the clear and manifest proofs brought by the messengers. It is this path alone that leads to certainty, sincerity, and authentic tawḥīd.
The two theological arguments are as follows:
(1) The Argument from Contingency and Necessity (Dalīl al-Imkān wa’l-Wujūb)
In ancient philosophy, thinkers employed the terminology of cause and effect. The Muʿtazilah recast this into a discussion of existence and non-existence, and then Ibn Sīnā further developed it by introducing the concepts of the Necessary Existent (wājib al-wujūd) and the Contingent Existent (mumkin al-wujūd). The Ashʿarīs and other theologians later adopted this entire discussion directly from Ibn Sīnā.
Accordingly, they divide existence into two fundamental categories: the Necessary Existent and the Contingent Existent.
The Necessary Existent is defined as that which exists by itself, is not preceded by non-existence, does not admit annihilation, and for which reason deems it impossible to require any cause or agent. Such an existence is held to be rationally necessary, to the extent that the mind cannot even conceive of its non-existence.
By contrast, the Contingent Existent is that which does not subsist by itself, but emerges from non-existence, whose annihilation is rationally possible, and for which existence and non-existence are equally conceivable. The realisation of such an existence depends upon an external cause and a determining factor (murajjiḥ) that transfers it from non-existence into existence.
On this basis, things are rationally divided into three categories:
Necessary
Contingent
Impossible
The Necessary neither admits origination nor non-existence; the Contingent admits both existence and non-existence; and the Impossible is that whose existence reason deems inconceivable.
Thus, all entities and concepts present in the mind must fall under one of these three descriptions: necessary, contingent, or impossible.
The reality of the Contingent Existent is that it stands in perfect equilibrium between existence and non-existence, like two evenly balanced scales. Without preference being given to one side, it would remain in non-existence. Hence, reason self-evidently judges that a contingent being requires a determining factor that brings it out of non-existence into existence.
To clarify this principle, some present the example of a microscopic organism possessing an extraordinarily precise, organised, and astonishing mechanical structure. Sound reason instinctively judges that such an ordered and intricate structure—contingent in its essence, attributes, and states—cannot arise spontaneously without a cause. When it is suspended between thousands of possible forms, with no intrinsic preference for one over another, its adoption of a specific arrangement, system, and motion cannot be explained by mere chance.
According to this line of reasoning, the dominance of existence over non-existence among contingents indicates the presence of a determining factor that preferred existence over non-existence. This determining factor cannot itself be contingent, for a contingent would either emerge from non-existence—an evident impossibility—or from another contingent, which would lead to infinite regress or circularity, both deemed impossible. Therefore, it is deemed necessary that this determining factor be the Necessary Existent.

Commenting on this technical mode of argumentation, Ibn Taymiyyah (may God have mercy upon him) states:
“As for discourse using the terms ‘Necessary Existent’ and ‘Contingent Existent’, this originates with Ibn Sīnā and those like him, who derived it from the discourse of the Muʿtazilī theologians and others. The language of their predecessors contains only the terms ‘cause’ and ‘effect’.”
(al-Ṣafadiyyah 2/180; see also Minhāj al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah 2/132)
(2) The Argument from Origination (Dalīl al-Ḥudūth)
The argument from origination is constructed upon several logical premises from which a necessary conclusion is drawn. Its foundation lies in the claim that everything that admits change and motion is originated, and that every originated thing necessarily requires an originator.
The first premise asserts that all entities in the universe are subject to change. This is established through sensory observation, for bodies undergo alteration, motions occur, attributes change, and nothing remains perpetually in a single state.
The second premise states that every changing thing is originated, since change indicates transition from one state to another. That which continually shifts from state to state cannot be pre-eternal; rather, it must require a beginning to its existence.
The third premise asserts that every originated thing must have an originator, because an originated entity lacks the capacity to bring itself into existence. If no originator is posited, its existence would be attributed to mere chance, which reason deems impossible.
From these premises it is concluded that, since the universe is subject to change, it is originated; and since it is originated, it requires an originator who is not himself originated, who subsists by himself, is free from change, and does not depend upon any external cause.
The mutakallimūn express this conclusion by stating that if the originator were himself originated, he would require another originator, leading either to an infinite regress or to circular causation—both of which reason regards as impossible. Hence, it is deemed necessary that the originator be an existence transcending origination and change, self-subsistent, and the starting point of the entire chain of origination.
Disclaimer: This article was translated by AI. Original post: https://t.me/DrAkramNadwi/8240