The Continuity of Transmission (al-Tawātur) in Ḥadīth
Necessary knowledge and inferential knowledge
Al-Ḥāfiẓ Ibn Ḥajar said in Nuzhat al-Naẓar, his commentary on Nukhbat al-Fikar:
“And this is the relied upon view: that a report conveyed by tawātur imparts necessary knowledge, which is the kind of knowledge that a human being is compelled to accept such that it is impossible for him to deny it.” (p. 44)
And in his discussion of the mashhūr:
“Among those who have affirmed that it imparts inferential knowledge are al-Ustād Abū Manṣūr al-Baghdādī, al-Ustād Abū Bakr Ibn Fūrak and others.” (p. 54)
And in defining naẓar (reasoned inference):
“It is the arrangement of known or supposed things, through which one arrives at knowledge or suppositions.” (p. 45)
And in differentiating necessary from inferential knowledge:
“For necessary knowledge imparts knowledge without any inference, whereas inferential knowledge imparts it only with inference. Also, necessary knowledge arises for every hearer, while inferential knowledge arises only for one who possesses the aptitude for inference.” (p. 45)
Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya said:
“They divided knowledge into necessary and inferential. The inferential rests on the necessary. The necessary is that which imposes itself upon the human soul with a compulsion from which it cannot detach itself. This is the definition of al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr al-Ṭayyib and others: its distinctive mark is that it attaches to the soul in such a way that it is impossible to push it away.” (Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā 13/70).
I say: This division of knowledge into necessary and inferential is among the worst of the views of the logicians, philosophers, and their followers among the mutakallimūn and the uṣūliyyūn, and among the most corrupt. It arises from their erroneous understanding of the sources of knowledge. For what is this so-called knowledge that adheres to the human being so necessarily that he cannot free himself from it? God says:
> “And Allah brought you out of the wombs of your mothers not knowing anything, and He made for you hearing, sight, and hearts that you may give thanks.” (Sūrat al-Naḥl 16:78)
The human being is created knowing nothing, but he is given alongside his fiṭrah the means of acquiring knowledge. These means are the five senses, the intellect, and revelation. Thus man at creation has no knowledge beyond his fiṭrah; he acquires knowledge through the senses, the intellect, and revelation.
Therefore, the true division of knowledge is into innate (fiṭrī) and acquired (kasbī). Acquired knowledge is subdivided into sensory knowledge, rational knowledge, and revealed knowledge (granted to the prophets). This division and ordering were clear to the early generations of this ummah. Details of it may be given elsewhere.
Certain knowledge
Ibn Ḥajar said: “The first [type] is the mutawātir, which imparts certain knowledge.” (p. 44) And: “Certainty is firm conviction that corresponds to reality.” (p. 44)
I say: Certainty does not arise simply from something existing externally. For vision, for instance, does not occur simply by the existence of the visible object: the one who sees must have sound eyesight, there must be no obstruction, there must be intent to see, and there must be repeated experience of seeing. Likewise, in every type of knowledge, the reality is not attained by words and terms alone, but by their linkage to the realities they signify. And this linkage between terms and realities is laborious, involving stages of trial and error.
Thus, knowledge in its essence is presumptive (ẓannī). For realities, whether material or immaterial, are always greater than any perception or description of them. Even the human finger is greater than all that specialists know about it. A person may grasp a truth from one aspect, but from other aspects remain ignorant of it, or grasp it incompletely. Therefore certainty does not pertain to the known itself but to the knower.
However certain the thing itself may be, certainty is not attained by the knower without passing through many stages in the pursuit of knowledge.
The path of knowledge is: the object sought must be true; it must resonate with the fiṭrah; then the human being must engage it through his senses and intellect, thereby attaining some degree of knowledge; with practice and experience that knowledge increases. For example, when one reads God’s statement: “I answer the supplication of the supplicant when he calls upon Me” (2:186), this is true, certain, and sound. The believer then engages in supplication, and through repeated practice of duʿāʾ his knowledge of the verse grows. He may attain certainty, or remain below it.
Hence the concern of the muḥaddithūn is with the ṣaḥīḥ report, not its tawātur or fame. Once a report is established as authentic, it becomes a means of knowledge, which increases through reflection, understanding, and practice.
Knowledge, at its beginning, is always presumptive. Whoever wishes not to act upon anything until he attains certainty in it, has wished for the impossible.
Tawātur
Ibn Ḥajar discussed tawātur, defined it, and set its conditions (pp. 41–43).
I say: The muḥaddithūn never defined it, nor did the Imāms of fiqh. It is an imported notion, of no use at all. Indeed, ḥadīth that fulfil their definition of tawātur do not even exist. None mentioned it in the sciences of ḥadīth before al-Khaṭīb.
Al-Khaṭīb said in al-Kifāyah:
“A report is that which may admit of truth or falsehood. It is divided into two kinds: tawātur and āḥād. The tawātur report is that which is conveyed by a number of people so numerous that by established custom it is impossible they could have conspired to lie, or colluded within the time that the report spread, and that what they report is of such a kind that doubt and confusion cannot enter into it, and that motives for falsehood are absent among them. When such a report is transmitted, its truth is certain, and knowledge of it is necessary.” (al-Kifāyah, p. 16).
Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ said in his discussion of the mashhūr:
“Among the mashhūr is the mutawātir, which is mentioned by the fuqahāʾ and the uṣūliyyūn. The muḥaddithūn do not mention it by that specific name with that specific meaning. If al-Khaṭīb mentioned it, in his words is an indication that he followed therein those other than the muḥaddithūn, perhaps because it is not encompassed by their discipline, nor is it to be found in their narrations. For it is defined as a report transmitted in such a way as to impart knowledge of its truth necessarily, and this condition must be maintained throughout its isnād, from beginning to end. Whoever is asked to produce an example of such a ḥadīth will find himself at a loss.” (pp. 453–454).
I say: As for citing the ḥadīth, “Whoever lies about me deliberately, let him take his seat in the Fire”, I do not know what benefit lies in calling it mutawātir. Would its ruling change if it were not? What matters is that it is ṣaḥīḥ. It is simply an explanation of God’s words: “And who is more unjust than one who fabricates lies against God?” (Sūrat al-Anʿām 6:21), and similar verses condemning lying against God.
ʿAllāmah Anwar Shāh al-Kashmīrī divided tawātur into four kinds: isnād-tawātur, which is that of the muḥaddithūn; generational-tawātur, like that of the Qurʾān; tawātur of practice and inheritance, such as the siwāk and the five prayers; and tawātur of shared meaning, such as the miracles. (See: Introduction to his Ikfār al-Mulḥidīn fī Ḍarūriyyāt al-Dīn).
This division too is of no use. Nothing is established thereby. It stems from failure to grasp the nature of report and history. For history is not proven by something being inherited generation after generation. How many beliefs and customs have been inherited among polytheists and disbelievers, yet they are false, fabricated lies against God and His prophets.
The correct method is that of the muḥaddithūn: to investigate the authenticity of the ḥadīth. Once a ḥadīth is ṣaḥīḥ, it is obligatory to act upon it in the detailed ways described by the muḥaddithūn and the fuqahāʾ.
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Disclaimer: This article was translated by AI. Original post: https://t.me/DrAkramNadwi/6826
